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Essays on Unemployment and
Labor Supply
Arash Nekoei
Understanding the determinants of individuals’ participation in market-base production is the focus of the three
essays presented here.
Chapter 1 attempts to address a fundamental question that
has not been resolved by the existing literature: Does unemployment insurance (UI) induce a simple delay in job acceptance as the unemployed enjoy subsidized leisure? Or do the
unemployed use additional benefits to actively improve their
job opportunities, so that subsidizing a longer search results
in a better job? These questions have significant implications
for our understanding of unemployment and the design of
unemployment insurance.
Contrary to standard search model predictions, prior studies fail to estimate a positive effect of UI on reemployment
wages. Chapter 1, coauthored with Andrea Weber, addresses
this puzzle in two steps. First, it estimates a positive UI wage
effect by exploiting an age-based regression discontinuity
in Austrian administrative data. Second, it shows that these
empirical estimates can be reconciled with search theory
once our model incorporates duration dependence. In fact,
in such a setting, the UI wage effect is determined as the
balance between two offsetting forces: UI causes agents to
seek higher-wage jobs but also reduces wages by lengthening
unemployment. This implies a negative relationship between
the UI unemployment-duration and wage effects, which
holds empirically both in our sample and across studies,
reconciling disparate wage-effect estimates.
Connecting these results to a normative model of UI
points to an overlooked welfare benefit: UI increases future
tax revenue through higher wages. We show that this positive
fiscal externality is of the same order of magnitude as the
traditional negative moral-hazard externality emphasized in
prior work. These results suggest that taking into account
gains in job quality could significantly change the optimal
generosity of UI.
Chapter 2 offers a dynamic view of unemployment,
which allows us to study the separation of workers from
firms as well as their hiring. In my framework, layoffs stem
from temporary wage rigidity and noncontactable productivity shocks. Using an optimal allocation approach, I show
that the optimum allocation is realized when employers
internalize not only the direct cost of layoff, i.e., expected
UI benefits, but also two additional costs: 1) the uninsured
cost of layoff due to moral hazard, which takes the form of a
Pigovian tax; and 2) the increase in the unemployment rate
due to lower effort from workers. These results shed some
light on our understanding of UI tax design.
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Chapter 3 offers a close look at the household labor
supply decisions, in particular, how price shocks can affect
the labor supply of its members. The chapter examines this
question by exploiting exchange rate variations as exogenous
price shocks to immigrants’ budget constraints. This helps to
answer the following question: Are an immigrant’s decisions
affected in real time by her home country’s economy? I
find that in response to a 10 percent dollar appreciation, an
immigrant decreases her earnings by 0.92 percent, mainly by
reducing hours worked. The exchange rate effect is greater
for recent immigrants, married immigrants with absent
spouses, Mexicans close to the border, and immigrants from
countries with higher remittance flows. A neoclassical interpretation of these findings suggests that the income effect
exceeds the cross-substitution effect. Remittance targets offer
an alternative explanation.

Chapter 1
Do Unemployment Benefits Improve
Job-Match Quality?
(coauthored with Andrea Weber)
The great recession, accompanied by soaring unemployment rates, has brought UI back to the center of public
attention. The debate rages on about whether generous UI
programs provide a remedy or exacerbate the problem.
Program proponents point out the value of insurance against
income loss from layoff and long-term unemployment, while
opponents cite a robust empirical finding in labor economics:
UI reduces the incentives for job search and increases jobless
durations.
A key factor missing from the current debate has been
the effect of UI on job-match quality. According to the theory
of job search, UI prolongs jobless durations for two reasons:
1) agents spend less time and effort looking for a job, and
2) agents become more selective in the type of job they seek.
The latter channel implies that access to unemployment
benefits may help job seekers find better jobs. In the past,
however, UI proponents were cautious to make the case for a
positive effect on job quality, since “the evidence here is very
thin” (Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 2005, p. 211]).1 In fact,
until very recently, most of the available estimates of the
unemployment benefit effect on job quality, mainly measured
by wages, were not significantly different from zero (Card,
Chetty, and Weber 2007; Lalive 2007; Van Ours and
Vodopivec 2008).
Evidence for Positive Effects of UI on Job Quality
Chapter 1 demonstrates empirically that access to more
generous UI does indeed lead to agents finding better jobs.
Moreover, it explains why previous studies had a hard time
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identifying this effect. In particular, it exploits a quasiexperimental design to study the effects of an extension of
the potential unemployment benefit duration on job search
outcomes, using 19 million job separations recorded in Austrian administrative data.
Consistent with prior research, Chapter 1 estimates that an
increase in potential benefit duration causes workers to stay
jobless longer. But in contrast with previous studies, we find
that the benefit extension also causes workers to find jobs
that pay, on average, 0.5 percent higher wages. Moreover, the
positive wage effect persists over time and does not substitute any other desirable job characteristics.
Investigating the mechanisms driving the positive effect
of UI on wages, we find that it results from an attenuation
of wage declines between pre- and postunemployment jobs.
In particular, access to more generous benefits reduces the
likelihood of experiencing a wage loss that is larger than
40 percent and increases the likelihood of achieving a wage
increase between 0 and 10 percent.
Exploiting the matched employer-employee component of
the Austrian data, we also investigate whether unemployed
workers benefitting from UI either find jobs in higher-paying
firms or find better-paying jobs in an average firm. Our results
show that UI helps job-seekers move toward “better” firms:
they find jobs in larger firms with higher proportions of male
and older employees, which typically proxy for a higher
bargaining power of workers. Most importantly, we document
that these unemployed workers are moving to firms that, on
average, pay higher wages to their other employees.
Folk Wisdom
Consider two popular explanations for unemployment.
According to the first explanation, unemployment is due
to randomness in job search.2 The second one argues that
randomness is not an issue, but that the mismatch between
workers’ skills and firms’ demand for skills creates unemployment. In this world, unemployed workers have to wait
for a suitable vacancy to open or acquire necessary skills for
available vacancies.
UI subsidizes job search in either scenario because it
gives unemployed individuals more time to sample job offers
or prepare for the right vacancy. Following this argument, UI
should raise jobless durations and, at the same time, increase
job quality. Additionally, it also subsidizes leisure so that
agents may delay starting an accepted offer, which would
lead to agents lowering their effort with no effect on job
quality. Folk wisdom can thus explain positive or zero effects
of UI on job quality.
Folk Wisdom is Incomplete
Contrary to folk wisdom, the effect of UI on subsequent job-match quality is not necessarily positive, as it is
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determined by two offsetting forces. On the one hand, UI
increases agents’ selectivity, which in turn has a positive
effect on job quality. On the other hand, UI raises jobless
durations and may thus reduce job quality, as job opportunities decline over the jobless spell. This decline in job opportunity over time can be caused by multiple factors, such as
loss of human capital, stigma, screening by employers, or
diminished savings.3
If we assume that job seekers are rational and forward
looking in their decisions, how can a more generous unemployment benefit lead to a lower subsequent job quality?
This is theoretically possible, as agents care about well-being
or consumption rather than just the earnings when they are
employed. It can be shown that UI creates a wedge between
the two and can thus reduce wages, although it always
increases consumption.
A Reconciliation of Empirical Findings
A large body of existing empirical work has not found
any effect of UI on job quality. For instance, three prominent
papers that use quasi-experimental designs and administrative data provide estimates of UI effects on wages that
are not significantly different from zero (Card 2007; Lalive
2007; Ours 2008). Moreover, there is recent evidence of a
statistically significant negative wage effect for Germany
(Schmeider, von Wachter, and Bender 2013), while the evidence discussed above finds a positive effect for Austria.
These different empirical findings do not contradict theory
once we take into account duration dependence, meaning
that the job seeker’s opportunities and skills deteriorate
the longer she remains out of a job, while at the same time
unemployment benefits decrease. We show that a job search
model incorporating duration dependence can reconcile the
contrasting empirical estimates of the effect of UI on job
quality.
Moreover, the model highlights a potential source of
heterogeneity that drives empirical estimates, namely,
the relative importance of search effort vs. selectiveness
in determining the job finding rate. This heterogeneity is
reflected in a negative correlation between the effect of UI on
jobless durations and its effect on job quality. We show that
the negative correlation holds in a meta-analysis of existing
estimates: studies that estimate stronger effects of unemployment benefits on jobless durations also tend to find smaller
effects of benefits on job quality and vice versa.
Policy Implications
As the UI system is designed to balance the value of
insurance against job loss with the cost of extra taxes, an
important policy question is, what is the optimal level of
generosity of unemployment insurance? The conventional
answer to this question has focused on the effect of unem2015 Dissertation Summaries

ployment benefits on unemployment durations. As insurance
reduces the incentives of jobless agents to find a job, it raises
aggregate benefit payments and creates higher taxes for the
rest of the population. In the conventional model, this negative fiscal externality is balanced against the insurance or
consumption-smoothing value of UI to determine the optimal
benefit generosity.
However, if UI also affects job quality, it might change
future tax revenues. The total fiscal externality of the program should thus be calculated as the sum of the traditional
negative externality from increased unemployment durations, and the externality from job quality, the sign of which
depends on the sign of the effect of UI on job quality (and is
theoretically undetermined).4
In the Austrian case, the externality from job quality is
positive and has the same order of magnitude as traditional
duration externality, but with the opposite sign. Based on our
theoretical insights and this empirical estimate, we conclude
that the optimal generosity of UI varies depending on the
relative importance of the effort versus selectivity margins
in job search. These results suggest that taking into account
gains in job quality could significantly change the policy
recommendations regarding the optimal generosity of unemployment insurance.

Chapter 2
The Design of Unemployment Insurance:
Benefits and Taxes
Unemployment benefits increase unemployment spells by
reducing a laid-off worker’s job search efforts or increasing
her job selectiveness (e.g., reservation wage). Job search
and selectiveness are both unobservable by the government.
The resulting moral hazard creates a fiscal externality that
should be balanced against the insurance of unemployment
benefit. This trade-off has been the basis for the estimation of
optimal unemployment benefits.
However, the layoff decision itself is affected by UI
taxes levied on firms. The common understanding is that
perfect experience rating is the optimal policy in this regard.
Perfect experience rating means that firms pay the full UI of
worker layoffs through higher taxes. The argument in favor
of perfect experience rating originates in Feldstein (1976).
The general insight is that an incomplete experience-rated
UI system creates a cross-subsidy between firms and makes
employers more likely to lay off workers and employees
more willing to work in layoff-prone firms.5 This is due to
the fact the firms and workers do not completely internalize
the social cost of layoff.
In this chapter, we investigate this question and derive the
condition under which such intuition holds. The main feature
of the model is two asymmetry of information: unemployed
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agents’ efforts are not observable by planner, and firms’ layoff risks are not perfectly observable by agents.
In a simple static model, I show the trinity among full
insurance, production efficiency, and perfect experience
rating. Production efficiency is achieved with a Pigovian
internalization such that a laying-off firm faces a marginal
tax rate equal to the worker’s cost of layoff. Moreover,
full insurance put unemployment benefit equal to this cost.
Therefore, full insurance and production efficiency together
imply that the layoff tax should be equal to unemployment
benefit, i.e., perfect experience rating.
However, this intuition breaks down once UI does not
completely insure the agents due to assymetry of information (moral hazard problem) (Baily 1978). In this case, the
employer needs to internalize not only the direct cost of
layoff—that is, the expected unemployment benefit—but two
extra costs: 1) the uninsured cost of layoff (a Pigovian tax),
and 2) the increase in the unemployment rate due to lower
effort from workers. The latter stems from the fact that the
idea of optimality of perfect experience rating is based on the
direct fiscal externality created by a layoff (higher taxes on
others), whereas the indirect externality (higher layoff rate
creates a behavioral response among unemployed workers)
is ignored.
Furthermore, we show that the layoff tax depends on the
degree of layoff-risk observability at the time of job search.
For example, in a world with no insurance, if the layoff risk
is unobservable, then layoff tax is positive due to uninsured
layoff cost. However, optimal layoff tax is zero in the other
extreme, where layoff risks are completely observable—as
in this case, wages are fully compensating agents for layoff
risks.
The main result of the chapter is the optimal unemployment benefit and taxation formula. I develop an optimal UI
taxation formula that depends on the degree of insurance of
unemployment benefit (moral hazard) as well as the degree
of compensation of layoff risk by firms (which depends on
the observability of layoff risks). Second, I show that the
Baily-Chetty-type formula for optimal unemployment benefit
level holds independently of UI taxes.
This chapter lies at the intersection of three research
strands. First, there is a four-decades-old debate about the
role of experience rating in the U.S. labor market. Feldstein
(1976) focuses on the effect of experience rating on temporary layoffs. In his model, firms are facing demand shocks
and have an exogenous number of attached employees, in the
sense that they do not search jobs elsewhere when unemployed. The main result is that incomplete experience rating
leads to an excess of temporary layoff. Albrecht and Vroman
(1999) examines the consequences of experience rating in an
efficiency wage model where layoff is caused by workers’
heterogeneity. They find that, in the presence of experience
rating, firms pay higher wages in order to avoid layoffs, and
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thus some degree of experience rating is part of the optimal
policy.
Several papers find empirical support for this prediction,
and they generally attribute a substantial share of temporary layoffs to incomplete experience rating.6 Anderson and
Meyer (2000) analyze the reintroduction of experience rating
in Washington State in 1984. Their findings suggest that
industry average tax rates are largely passed on to workers,
but much less of the difference between firm’s tax rate and
the industry average rate (see also Anderson and Meyer
[1997]).
The second strand of literature is closely related to the
first one but directly focuses on a layoff tax. Layard (2005)
observes that an increase in layoff costs has an ambiguous
impact on unemployment: it reduces both job creation and
job destruction.7 Mandatory firing costs can help employers
to promise credibly not to cut wages in low-profitability periods if layoff risks are unobservable (Karabay and McLaren
2011).8
The third related strand of literature attempts to estimate
the degree of compensating differentials for unemployment
risk. Topel (1984) finds the first evidence of compensation
for anticipated unemployment risk. The level of compensation decreases with UI generosity.9 Specifically, he estimates
a wage premium of about 1 percent for each point of unemployment when unemployment benefit replacement rate is 50
percent. More recently, several papers revisited this question
(e.g., Magnani [2002] and Moretti [2000]). In particular, Ruf,
Lalive, and Zweimuller (2006) estimate a firm-component
of layoff risk in spirit of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis
(1999). They then show that firms compensate workers for
this component. However, the effect is quite small and confined to temporary layoffs. Del Bono and Weber (2008) use
variation in the starting month of seasonal jobs as a predictor
of anticipated unemployment. They find that employers pay,
on average, 11 percent higher wages for seasonal jobs.
The closest paper to this work is Blanchard and Tirole
(2008). They consider the design of a UI system with taxes
and benefit. In a simple static framework, they offer intuitions on how several unrealistic assumptions are necessary
for the perfect experience rating to be optimal. One of the
unrealistic assumptions is the full insurance. This chapter
addresses (to some extent) the “challenge” they suggest in
this regard, which is “to extend the research on optimal UI,
which focuses on the optimal size and timing of benefits . . .
to a model where the destruction margin is endogenous” (p.
53). Furthermore, the assumption of complete unobservability of layoff risk in Blanchard and Tirole (2008) is relaxed,
which becomes important in the design of the UI system.
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Chapter 3
Immigrants’ Labor Supply and Exchange
Rate Volatility
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5(4):
144–164, 2013.
Are an immigrant’s decisions affected in real time by
her home country’s economy? We might expect this to be
the case, given the substantial amount of remittances they
transfer and their high rate of return. This chapter demonstrates this effect by showing that an immigrant changes her
labor behavior based on the purchasing power of her income
in her home country. In particular, immigrants consider both
the current home-country value of remittances as well as the
future home-country value of their savings. This means that
an immigrant’s intra- and intertemporal labor decisions are
affected by her home country’s economy, in addition to the
factors that influence native workers.
Empirical Findings
This chapter explores exchange rate variation as exogenous price shocks to the purchasing power of immigrants’
earnings. Using CPS March data for 1994–2011, I estimate
the exchange rate elasticity of earnings to be −0.092, so that
in response to a 10 percent appreciation of the U.S. dollar
relative to a currency, an average immigrant from that country reduces her annual earnings by 0.92 percent. This implies
that, for instance, a one-standard-deviation appreciation of
the U.S. dollar relative to the peso reduces annual earnings of
the average Mexican immigrant by 1 percent.
More than 60 percent of that earnings variation can be
explained by changes in annual hours worked. Two-thirds
of these changes (40 percent of all earnings variation) stem
from changes in the number of weeks worked. For example,
an average Mexican immigrant facing a one-standarddeviation depreciation of the peso relative to the dollar
reduces her annual full-time weeks worked by 0.23 weeks,
which are divided equally into part-time weeks and weeks
off. All these exchange rate effects on labor supply do not
differ significantly between female and male immigrants.
Consistently, the exchange rate effect is most pronounced
for immigrants who are more likely to have close ties to
their home countries. For instance, the effect is greatest for
a married immigrant whose spouse is absent and least for
an immigrant who lives with a spouse. Similarly, the effect
is greater for immigrants from countries with higher remittance flow. Mexicans, the largest immigrant group, are as
responsive to exchange rate variations as other immigrants.
Additionally, for those Mexicans living close to the Mexican
border, the exchange rate effect is doubled.
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Intuitively, we would also expect that immigrants’ ties
to their home countries weaken over time; that is, an immigrant’s amount of remittances and likelihood of return
decrease as she spends longer time abroad. I define this
concept as ‘disintegration’—a natural counterpart to the process of assimilation à la Chiswick (1978). I offer suggestive
evidence that an immigrant’s exchange rate effect decreases
as she spends more time in the United States. As such, disintegration seems indeed to occur. However, the slow speed
of disintegration means that U.S. immigrants remain at least
somewhat sensitive to their home countries’ exchange rates
throughout their lifetimes.
Theoretical Implications
The sign and magnitude of the estimated exchange rate
elasticity of earnings also sheds light on the characteristics
of individual preferences. In a neoclassical framework where
remittances enter household utility, exchange rate plays the
role of the price of remittances. In this case, the sign of this
elasticity implies that the income effect of exchange rate on
earnings exceeds the substitution effect—that is, leisure is a
gross complement of remittances.
To better understand the mechanisms behind the empirical results presented, the exchange rate effect is analyzed
using a collective model of the household. In such a setting,
intrahousehold efficiency implies that exchange rate affects
consumption and labor supply of immigrants only through its
effect on remittances. Therefore, the negative exchange rate
elasticity of earnings implies negative exchange rate elasticities of remittances and consumption. The combination of the
empirical findings and these theoretical results implies that
an appreciation of the dollar leads immigrants to work fewer
hours per week and fewer weeks per year, earn less per hour,
consume more, and send fewer dollars home.
The relatively large income effect of the exchange rate
is also consistent with an alternative explanation. Similar to
Camerer et al. (1997), it can be interpreted in the context of
reference-dependent preferences (here either target remittances or target earnings). Given the persistent nature of the
shocks in this setting, I argue that both neoclassical and reference-dependent preferences remain plausible explanations.
To interpret the magnitude of our estimate, I use a neoclassical model, as well as a model with reference-dependent
preferences. Broadly speaking, the magnitude of the estimated elasticity is rather large relative to the existing literature. I argue that this may be due to the fact that this estimate
is friction-free, as immigrants will choose relatively fewer
labor and consumption commitments ex ante in expectation
of frequent exchange rate shocks. In contrast, previous work
has estimated frictionless elasticities using large, infrequent
shocks that make it worthwhile for agents to pay the adjustment cost ex post to overcome friction. The difference in
magnitude between my elasticity estimate and the elasticity
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estimates generated by the large shock method is a matter for
further empirical analysis.
This chapter lies at the intersection of two research
strands, the first of which studies the determinants of remittance flows. The existing literature has, for the most part,
documented a set of correlations between various macroeconomic variables and remittance flows. In contrast, this
chapter uses exchange rate variation as a set of exogenous
shocks to the price of remittances, which affect the labor supply decisions of immigrants. This is closely related to Yang
(2008), who exploits exchange rate variations to study the
effect of changes in remittance flows on recipient families.
The second segment of related literature investigates the
determinants of immigrants’ economic decisions. In particular, Fox and Stark (1987) study a small group of temporary
Mexican workers in the United States from 1982 to 1983.
They estimate a positive correlation between immigrants’
labor supply and the purchasing power of the dollar in
Mexico. In comparison, the present study attempts to identify
the causal relationship between the home-country economic
situation and immigrants’ labor supply by comparing similar
immigrants from different countries.
Notes
1. For examples of such policy recommendations, see Chetty
(2010) and Council of Economic Advisers (2013). For anecdotal evidence of such a channel, see Lowrey (2013).
2. Randomness stems from sampling vacancies due to either the
lack of information about them (random search models) or the
lack of coordination among applicants (directed search models).
3. Many papers offer theoretical reasons for a negative duration
dependence, and some offer supportive empirical evidence;
Chapter 1 offers a discussion of this literature.
4. Following the literature on optimal unemployment benefits
design, we neglect potential general-equilibrium effects of benefits on nonrecipient workers. We provide supportive empirical
evidence for this assumption in our setting in Chapter 1.
5. For empirical evidence for the latter, see Deere (1991).
6. For instance, Topel (1983) and Card and Levine (1994) use
variation in experience rating across states, and Anderson and
Meyer (1994) follow the same methodology, in addition to
using variation in unemployment insurance tax at the firm level.
Saffer (1983) provides an alternative approach using variation
in marginal layoff tax across industry. Furthermore, the relative
size of industries in a state seems to be affected by UI system,
and in particular by the subsidies implicit in incomplete experience rating (Deere 1991; Testa 1989). For empirical evidence
on cross-subsization through UI taxes, see Anderson and Meyer
(1993), Becker (1972), and Munts and Asher (1981).
7. See also Mortensen and Pissarides (1994, 1999) and Millard
and Mortensen (1997).
8. Several papers attempt to measure the effect of layoff taxes
on permanent layoffs. The best examples are studies using
the introduction of layoff tax for elderly workers in some
European countries (Behaghel 2008; Hakola and Uusitalo 2005;
Schnalzenberger 2009). Most importantly, Hakola and Uusitalo
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(2005) study a reform in the Finnish pension system and find
that an increase in the cost of laying off elderly workers by one
year of earnings reduces the layoff probability by 1 percentage
point.
9. For prior work that found minor find negligible and often
negative compensation for unemployment risk, see Abowd and
Ashenfelter (1981, 1984); Bronars (1983); and Hamermesh and
Wolfe (1990).
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